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SEX, MARRIAGE AND HISTORY:
ANALYZING THE CONTINUED
RESISTANCE TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Josephine Ross*
M ARRIAGE has long been seen as what makes sex legitimate -
iterally making it legal, roping it off from all those other kinds
ofsex for which an appalled neighborhood might haul you in
front of the local ecclesiastical or county court.
E. J. Graff'
And she steal love's sweet bait from fearful hooks.
Being held a foe, he may not have access
To breathe such vows as lovers use to swear;
And she as much in love, her means much less
To meet her new beloved anywhere.
But passion lends them power, time means, to meet,
Tempering extremities with extreme sweet.
William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet2
I. PUBLIC RESISTANCE TO RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE IS A VICIOUS CIRCLE
There continues to be a good deal of opposition in this country to mar-
riages by same-sex couples. 3 Public opinion constitutes the main obstacle
to legal advancement although there is growing acceptance of same-sex
couples. There is no lack of constitutional theories demonstrating that
gays and lesbians are entitled to enjoy the benefits and responsibilities of
* Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A.,
Oberlin College; J.D., Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to Phyllis Goldfarb
and Catherine Wells for their advice and encouragement throughout. I also would like to
thank George Fisher and Anthony Farley for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. E.J. GRAFF, WHAT Is MARRIAGE FOR?: THE STRANGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OUR
MOST INTIMATE INSTITUTION 53 (1999).
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET (Jill L. Levinson ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2000) 1554-1616) (Act 2, Prologue by the Chorus).
3. Nationally, 51% of Americans are opposed to allowing gay couples to marry while
34% approve. Will Lesser, Poll: Americans Back Some Gay Rights, AP Story found at
http://www.hrc.org/newsreleases/2000/000531.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2002). A poll con-
ducted in 1993, found 60% opposed gay "legal partnerships." U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT, July 5, 1993, at 42-43. In 1987, 75% opposed same-sex marriage.
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civil marriage. 4 Despite persuasive arguments in courts, however, propo-
nents of same-sex marriage are facing many setbacks in the ballot boxes
and legislatures.
Anti-marriage legislation has been sweeping across this country, re-
ferred to as DOMA (the federal Defense of Marriage Act) and mini-
DOMAs.5 The 1999 decision by the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v.
Vermont6 should also be understood against the background of Hawaii
where voters amended the state constitution just as the Hawaii Supreme
Court appeared set to hand out to gay men and lesbians the first marriage
victory.7 The opinions in Baker are laudable in their recognition of gay
couples as having human relationships that deserve the protections and
equitable distribution of benefits by the state. Yet the majority stopped
short of bestowing civil marriage licenses to same-sex couples, deferring
instead to the legislative branch to fashion the appropriate remedy. Juris-
prudentially, the Vermont Court was illogical to call for equality but set-
tle for legislation creating a parallel system to marriage that is separate
and unequal.8 Certainly one reading of the decision is that the Vermont
Supreme Court judges were realists who knew that if they granted full
4. For some examples of articles that lay out constitutional arguments in favor of
same-sex marriage see for example, Andrew Koppelman, Why Sex Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (equal protec-
tion and sex discrimination issues); Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage-Why Not?, 4 WID-
ENER J. PUB. L. 461 (1995) (equal protection as a suspect class); David Cruz, Just Don't
Call It Marriage: The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 925 (2001) (free speech issues); Mark Tanney, The Defense of Marriage Act: A
"Bare Desire to Harm" an Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Govern-
mental Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99, 143-46 (1997) (due process issues); Robert F.
Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons from Vermont's State Consti-
tutional Same-Sex Marriage Case, 42 B.C. L. REV. (2002) (marriage as a state constitutional
right); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998)
(see the plaintiff's brief on freedom of religion). In contrast, the scholarly position on why
gays should not be able to marry may best be summed up, as one colleague did in an oral
presentation: "The people have spoken."
5. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). In addi-
tion, thirty-three states currently have anti-marriage laws: Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Ar-
izona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. Seven states have anti-marriage
measures pending in their legislatures as this article goes to press: Massachusetts, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, Ohio, Wisconsin.
6. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
7. Baher v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). As the Hawaii Supreme Court appeared
set to hand out to gay men and lesbians the first marriage victory, voters passed a ballot
initiative amending the state constitution to exclude same-sex marriage from its equal pro-
tection guarantee.
8. In the year 2000, following the Baker decision, Vermont passed civil union legisla-
tion allowing state benefits to registered couples, the most sweeping domestic partnership
benefits in the nation. However, it is not called marriage and will therefore not trigger
federal recognition, which make up the bulk of economic benefits for married couples,
(e.g., social security, tax benefits). It will create questions for those couples that register
and move out of state. Panel Opts for Domestic Partnership, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Feb. 10, 2000, at A12; Michael Crowley, Vermont Court Gives Rights to Gay Couples: Leg-
islature to Decide Legal Implications, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 21, 1999, at 1A,
available at 1999 WL 29920387.
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marriage benefits, they would likely be overturned through a Constitu-
tional Amendment, as was done by the Hawaii electorate. Thus, public
sentiment was arguably the driving force behind the opinion as well as
the result. The Vermont controversy also showed that the public's opposi-
tion to marriage for same-sex couples does not necessarily mean that they
are anti-gay or against financial security and general stability for gay
couples. 9 The Vermont legislature created a parallel system of rights
called civil unions, which provide better protection for same-sex couples
than any domestic partnership legislation so far, while consciously avoid-
ing the term "marriage" to describe these unions. Although four of the
legislators who had cast ballots in favor of civil unions were voted out of
office, most were reelected, and there have been no ballot initiatives
seeking to amend the Vermont constitution. The sticking point was the
symbolism of the word "marriage" rather than the benefits and responsi-
bilities that come with marriage.
What are needed now, rather than new constitutional arguments to use
in court, are arguments that can convince the public. But first the mean-
ing of that resistance must be understood. More than ever what is needed
is a theory to explain the continued resistance to same-gender
marriages. 10
One reason for the public's resistance is that historically gay relation-
ships existed outside marriage, and marriage is "what makes sex legiti-
mate." As a result, same-sex relationships have been sexualized. In
conventional thinking, gay love is understood as the equivalent of gay
sex. Gay sex is perceived as profane, in contrast to marriage, which is
By not using the term "marriage," the Vermont civil unions will not constitute marriage
for the purpose of federal protections or rights (although there will probably be some liti-
gation around this).
9. A poll conducted on January 28, 1999 in Vermont found 43% of respondents in
favor of same-gender marriage, 48% opposed and 7% with no opinion. Vermonters Split
on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1999 at B5. During the November 2000 elec-
tions in Vermont, exit polls demonstrated that 51% of voters were pro-civil union. Gover-
nor Dean and Lt. Governor Doug Racine, who are pro-civil union, were re-elected.
Secretary of State Deb Markowitz and State Auditor Liz Ready are also pro-civil union.
Further, 17 of 19 pro-civil union Senate members were re-elected. See Vermont Civil
Union Election Results, available at http://www.glad.org/Publications/CivilRightProject/
vtelectionchart.PDF (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
10. This article uses the word "sex" and "gender" interchangeably because "sex" in
normal conversation usually means sexuality. This use of the term gender was appropri-
ated by Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she was litigating sex discrimi-
nation cases because she did not want to be in court talking about "sex." Josephine Ross,
The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage,
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 285 n.122 (citations omitted). In contrast, many other
scholars use the word "sex" to signify biological difference between men and women and
use the term "gender" to mean feminine and masculine. See, e.g., Frank Valdes, Unpacking
Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual Orientation to its Ori-
gins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 162 (1996); John Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments
Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1999). Like Ginsburg, I
think there is a problem with using the word "sex" when discussing something other than
sexuality, because sex means sexuality in common parlance. We lack an adequate language




perceived as sacred."1 To recognize gay marriage, therefore, is to elevate
same-sex love from the profane to the sacred, a seemingly insurmounta-
ble hurdle. One blatant example is a Vermont town clerk who refused to
issue civil union licenses to gay couples because she considered these un-
ions to be "an encouragement of perversion.' 2 A recent letter to my
local newspaper even used the term "profane" to describe same-sex mar-
riages. The writer was upset about the filing of a lawsuit in Massachusetts
in 2001 challenging the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage,
which he refers to as "a suit for the legalization of sodomy and profane
marriage." 13 In the 2000 presidential debate, George W. Bush explained
he was "not for gay marriage," referring to marriage as "a sacred institu-
tion."'1 4 In contrast, Bush referred to gay relationships in sexualized
terms, stating: "I don't think it's any of my concern how you conduct your
sex life." This sacred/profane dichotomy can be understood as a syllo-
gism: marriage is sacred, gay relationships are profane; therefore, mar-
riage should not include same-sex unions. It operates as a vicious circle.
11. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) ("Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred").
Compare Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The issue presented us is
only whether homosexuals, when defined as persons who engage in homosexual conduct,
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect classification"). The concepts of sacred and profane
certainly have religious roots in both Christianity and Judaism, see, e.g., KAREN ARM-
STRONG, ISLAM (2000) at 14-15 (contrasting early Christian to early Islamic teachings), but
it is the secular version or residual attitudes of these concepts that I am most interested in.
12. Ross Sneyd, Same-Sex Unions Denounced in Vt., AP, June 29, 2000, at 2000 WL
23361049.
13. TELEGRAM & GAZETTE SATURDAY, June 2, 2001, at A12 (emphasis added). Let-
ter by Thomas M. Stachura of Auburn entitled "Sodomy Is a Felony and Shouldn't Be
Legalized." This letter is an exception to the generally positive reaction this suit engen-
dered in the regional papers, specifically, the Boston Globe and the Worcester Telegram &
Gazette. The Worcester couple who were the focus of the original Telegram article in-
formed me that they received all sorts of letters and phone calls of encouragement includ-
ing from people they never met. See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 14 MASS. L.
RPTR. 591 (Mass. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2002).
14. President George W. Bush's statements during the second presidential debate.
When asked about his position on gay marriage, Bush replied: "I'm not for gay marriage. I
think marriage is a sacred institution between a man and a woman .... I am a tolerant
person ... I don't hire or fire someone based upon their sexual orientation. I don't think its
any of my concern how you conduct your sex life and I think it's a private matter." See
generally Josephine Ross, Sexualizing of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race and
Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C. R. - C.L. L. REv. 255 (2002) (examining the way
mixed-race relationships were seen as perverse or illicit sexual liaisons, especially before
the Supreme Court held mixed-race marriages to be worthy of Constitutional protection).
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Gay relationships exist f
outside marrie
The Vicious Circle
The reasoning is circular and self-sustaining. Lack of marital rights con-
stitutes both cause and effect. Marriage provides privacy and makes sex
legitimate. Gay relationships are viewed as sordid and pruriently sexual
because at least in part because they exist outside marriage, outside the
boundaries of what is deemed acceptable. Thus lack of marriage rights
causes gay relationships to be viewed in a distorted light. This in turn
makes them appear unworthy of marriage recognition. Continued depri-
vation of marriage is thus a circular enterprise. The circular nature of the
arguments against gay marriage make them particularly difficult to
combat.
II. WHY GAY RELATIONSHIPS ARE SEXUALIZED
A. WHETHER PROMISCUITY CAUSES GAY RELATIONSHIPS TO BE
VIEWED AS PROFANE
A society that has for much of the last millennium precluded in every
conceivable way the formation of gay couples, systematically denying
them any social, legal, fiscal, or religious acceptance, criticizes gay men
for casual sexual relations and concludes that their sexuality is not "well-
adjusted. "15
William Eskridge identified promiscuity among gay men as a reason
why Americans are hesitant to grant equal marriage rights to gays. He
turned this into an argument in favor of gay marriages, arguing that gay
men will become less promiscuous if they are allowed to marry.16 Marc
Fajer also identified promiscuity as the problem, but he viewed it as pri-
marily a problem of perception. Fajer's solution is for "advocates [to] use
stories about love and intimacy to counter the non-gay pre-understanding
15. John Eastburn Boswell, Jews, Bicycle Riders, and Gay People: The Determination
of Social Consensus and Its Impact on Minorities, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 223 (1989).
16. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERTY To CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 45 (1996). This point is also well rendered in Bos-
well, supra note 15, at 223. Fajer's book review also critiques this point, Marc A. Fajer,
Toward Respectful Representation: Some Thoughts On Selling Same-Sex Marriage, 15 YALE
L. &POL'Y REV. 599, 599 (1997). Straight men were supposed to be civilized by marriage.
See generally, GRAFF, supra note 1, at 59-68.
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that gay sex necessarily is obsessive, loveless, and promiscuous." 17
One staunch opponent of marriage for same-sex couples wrote, "sexual
fidelity is not an expected or typical characteristic in same-sex relation-
ships, especially among gay men," to support his contention that efforts
to recognize gay marriages are really a radical rejection of marriage. 1
The perception of promiscuity is a symptom of a deeper problem rather
than the problem itself. Did Magic Johnson not prove that promiscuity
was alive and well in the heterosexual world? 19 Straight male promiscu-
ity is not seen as a reason to deny marriage rights to heterosexual men.
The stereotyping of gays as promiscuous is but a symptom of the majority
culture's sexualization of gays.
Americans are obsessed with gay sex, and the obsession is unrelated to
concern about the quantity of sex partners. To explain what is meant by
obsession, consider this scenario: if a man says "my girlfriend is blond,"
or "I am married to a blond woman," no one will accuse him of talking
about sex. But if a gay man declares "my boyfriend is blond," he will be
understood to be discussing his sex life. An obsession or fixation with gay
people as sexual beings undergirds stereotypes about gays-the loose and
licentious stereotype, the child-abusing stereotype - that will not be cured
by protestations of monogamy.2 0 As psychologist Beverly Greene wrote:
"Lesbians and gay men are often depicted in ways that overly sexualize
them. Indeed, folklore and clinical research often focus on the sexuality
of lesbians and gay men as if that were all that defined them. '21
Lesbians are generally not viewed as promiscuous, yet their relation-
ships are also sexualized. An interchange that took place in my life high-
lights this strange emphasis on sex within the public psyche in viewing gay
people. I was on an airplane and happened to be sitting next to a profes-
17. Marc Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 MIAMI L. REV. 511, 518
(1992).
18. Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Re-
treat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 759 (1998). Wardle
also considers sexual relations among gay couples are different. This issue is discussed fur-
ther on in the article. "Obviously, sexual relations between persons of the same gender are
different from sexual relations between male and female couples. But that is not the only
difference. For instance, sexual fidelity is not an expected or typical characteristic in same-
sex relationships, especially among gay men." Id. at 759-760. From this promiscuity, War-
die infers a "virtually unrestricted restructuring of marriage" which would make it mean-
ingless. Id. at 760.
19. Derrick Z. Jackson, Male Athletes Needed Aboard the Anti-Aids Bandwagon, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1994, at 15. Magic Johnson's acknowledgement of casual sex with
multiple partners may have rivaled the notorious "Patient Zero" in Randy Shilts's book
about AIDS. RANDY SHILTs, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (St. Martin's Press 1987). In-
terestingly, it was Martina Navratilova, a lesbian athlete and spokeswoman for the gay
movement, who spoke negatively about Johnson's revelation. See Jackson, supra.
20. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 135-36 (debunking the myth that gay men are the primary
abusers of children).
21. Beverly Greene, Beyond Heterosexism and Across the Cultural Divide: Developing
an Inclusive Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Psychology: A Look to the Future, in EDUCATION,
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PSYCHOL-
oGY: A RESOURCE MANUAL 17 (Beverly Greene & Gladys L. Croom eds., 2000).
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sor from a prestigious university. We talked about many things and after
a while he asked me about my boyfriend, how long we had been going
out. I told him the number of years, but corrected the gender. He said,
"Oh, I've always wanted to know: What do lesbians do in bed?" His
question came out spontaneously and uncensored. His question didn't
suggest that I was promiscuous or even that I had a lot of sex. Rather, it
betrayed an obsession with gay sexuality and suggests that he views gay
sexuality as qualitatively different from his own, and that he equated my
coming out to him with a willingness to discuss sex, as if I had brought up
the topic. Since lesbians are generally viewed as less promiscuous than
gay or straight men, promiscuity is not the cause of the sexualized view of
gay relationships.
B. ROMEO AND JULIET AS GAY ALLEGORY
Graze where you will, you shall not house with me... Beg ! Starve! Die
in the streets! For by my soul I'll ne'er acknowledge thee.
22
Romeo and Juliet remains the quintessential rendering of straight ro-
mance, as the film Shakespeare in Love attests.23 In Shakespeare's play,
sex, love and marriage are intertwined. The couple's love is new and raw
and sexual; they have only known each other a couple of weeks. If the
same lines had been written about two men in love, the play would be
considered a play about sex. In contrast, Romeo and Juliet is considered a
romance. Illicit sexuality is shown as noble and pure because of the
young couple's desire to marry; because they are willing to accept punish-
ment, even death, in pursuit of their love; and because it is heterosexual.
The romantic tragedy also reads as a gay allegory. Two young people
love each other and desire each other but they can only do so in secret
because of the attitudes of their parents and the community at large. De-
spite their deep love, the community has the power to separate the lovers
and to declare their marriage meaningless. Romeo and his loved one's
decision to follow their hearts renders them outcasts in their own fami-
lies. 24 Although they find a religious man to marry them,-"God joined
my heart and Romeo's, thou our hands" 25-their community does not
recognize their marriage vows. In the same-sex version of Shakespeare's
drama, some would likely view the Montagues and Capulets not as vil-
lains, but as sensible people that define marriage in such a way that it
excludes same-sex unions.26
22. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2, act 2, sc. 5.
23. Winner of 1999 Academy Award for Best Picture.
24. See generally, SHAKESPEARE, supra note 2.
25. Id. act 4, sc. 1.
26. Death for love's sake, at the heart of Romeo and Juliet, also finds strong parallel
among the gay youth of today. Reports of problems among Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
(GLB) youth suggest that many are at risk of developing emotional, social, and physical
health problems. Among the most important of these is an apparently two-to-threefold
increased rate of suicide attempts among GLB youth. James Lock & Hans Steiner, Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Youth Risks for Emotional, Physical, and Social Problems: Results
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Shakespeare reveals how interwoven romance, sex, and marriage can
be. Given this interweaving, it is difficult to advocate for same-gender
marriage in a culture which views the raw sexuality and passion of Romeo
and Juliet as pure, meanwhile viewing the gay version of the play as sor-
did. Romeo and Juliet illustrates that notions of gay profanity are not
rooted in promiscuity.
C. LANGUAGE REINFORCES SEXUALIZED VIEW OF
GAY RELATIONSHIPS
But I'm not being radical when I kiss you
And I don't love you to make a point.27
The sexualizing of gay men and lesbians must be understood in the
context of patriarchy, which makes all but the most limited forms of sexu-
ality off limits. As James Baldwin once said: "Nobody really cares who
goes to bed with whom, finally .... They care that you should be fright-
ened of what you do. As long as you feel guilty about it, the State can rule
you."'28 Or, as Michael Bronski wrote in 1984: "The patriarchy is sus-
tained through a complex network of gender, racial, and sexual arrange-
ments. Erotophobia-the fear of sexuality-is a bulwark of support for
those standards. Patriarchy is supported, to a large degree, by sexual
repression. '2 9
By making most sexual desires taboo, society is able to make people
fearful. The converse is also true; the way to make people fear an outside
group is to brand it as sexually deviant. According to Foucault, the focus
on sexuality by doctors in the 19th century gave birth to the concept of
homosexuality.30 Sexuality was dissected and a person who had same-
gender sexual desires was labeled based on these desires, as a "homosex-
from a Community Based Survey, J. Am. ACAD. OF CHILI) & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY,
Mar. 1, 1999, 1999 WL 11376107. The Shakespearean couple find lasting love and marriage
only in death. One could argue that currently gay youth are killing themselves because
they see their quest for love as hopeless.
27. CATIE CURTIS, TRUTH FROM LIES, (Emd/Capitol 1995) It goes on like this: "It's
the hollow of my heart that cries when I miss you/And keeps me alive when we're apart."
Id. Curtis is a current lesbian folk singer with cross-over appeal.
28. Richard Goldstein, "Go The Way Your Blood Beats": An Interview with James
Baldwin, in JAMES BALDWIN, THE LEGACY 173 (Quincy Troupe ed., 1989).
29. MICHAEL BRONSKI, CULTURE CLASH: THE MAKING OF GAY SENSIBILITY 10
(1984). Stereotyping is a process of endowing "the other" with traits we consider bad,
which includes sexual promiscuity and licentiousness. See Greene, supra note 21, at 3,
quoting the words of psychologist R.J. Siegel: "Fear is the glue that maintains existing
biases" for "fear becomes part of the process of projecting onto those whom we see as
unlike ourselves all of the attributes that we would like to deny in ourselves." Overcoming
bias through awareness, mutual encouragement and commitment. RACISM IN THE LIVES
OF WOMEN: TESTIMONY, THEORY AND GUIDES TO PRAC'ICE 295-301 (Jeanne Adleman &
Gloria Enguidanos eds., 1995).
30. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, AN INTRODUCIION 36-45(Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976). He refers to psychologists, psychia-
trists and medical doctors that focused on sexual practices and pleasures that gave these
"peripheral sexualities" a permanent reality. "The sodomite had been a temporary aberra-
tion; the homosexual was now a species .... The nineteenth century and our own have been
rather the age of multiplication: a dispersion of sexualities, a strengthening of their dispa-
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ual" person. Hence the origins of gay identity was a sexual definition. The
equation gay love = profane sex must be understood as connected to the
prevailing definition of "gay" as a sexual mode of being.
Plaintiffs' briefs in the Vermont lawsuit showcased loving same-sex
couples without ever using the word "gay" or "sexual orientation." This
appeared to annoy the other side. In their reply brief, counsel for the
State complains that plaintiffs do not even reveal if they are homosexual
or not.31 Can anyone be any more "out" than filing a law suit proclaim-
ing one's love and commitment for someone of the same gender? Again,
the State is fixating on the sexual identity of the two parties as if gay
meant something different from two people who love each other and
want to make a commitment that is emotional, public and spiritual.32 This
avoidance of the term "gay" by the Vermont plaintiffs raises certain ques-
tions. In advocating for marital rights, is it necessary to divorce oneself
from the term "gay" in order to avoid the "profane" stigma? Does the
concept of "gay" as a "sexual" orientation contribute to the view of gay
intimacy as profane? How else can the term "gay" be defined?
While the sexualizing of gays has been imposed from outside, it has
also been embraced within the gay movement. Even the word "sexual" is
part of accepted definitions of gay identity: the phrase "sexual orienta-
tion" is uniformly used within the gay community, replacing the criticized
"sexual preference" of the 1980s, and many gay scholars define gays as a
"sexual minority." There is another way that theorists could have framed
the issue of self-definition, namely, the emphasis could have been on rela-
tionships rather than on sexuality. 33 For example "relationship orienta-
tion," "gender orientation," or "gay orientation" are terms that omit the
word "sexual" and thereby focus on relationships more than sexuality.
Adrienne Rich defined lesbianism broadly in her seminal essay, Com-
pulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.34 She proposed that lesbi-
anism refer "not simply [to] the fact that a woman has had or consciously
desired genital sexual experience with another woman," but "to embrace
many more forms of primary intensity between and among women, in-
cluding the sharing of a rich inner life."'35 What was important in Rich's
view, was bonding among women; her focus was on relationships and on
gender. Instead of equating gays with sexuality, gays could be equated
with relationships, relationships that challenge gender norms.
rate forms, a multiple implantation of perversions. Our epoch has initiated sexual
heterogeneities."
31. State's Reply Brief, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888-89 (Vt. 1999).
32. The wisdom of the plaintiffs' move, is that by defining the couples by their life and
relationship rather than by sex or sexuality, they avoid the Hardwick trap. The Hardwick
trap is the argument that gays are people who are sexually intimate with those of their own
gender; the constitution allows criminalization of this sexual intimacy; therefore, gay men
and lesbians must not be entitled to any constitutional protection.
33. Ross, supra note 14, at 280-85.





Within the gay community, the definition of "gay" as a sexual mode of
being has generally succeeded while Rich's view receded.36 The gay
movement in general, and queer theorists in particular, have contributed
to this notion of gay sex being the defining aspect of gay lives. Queer
theory, one of the outgrowths of postmodernism, has been particularly
clear about framing gay people as sexual minorities. 37 Embracing gay
identity as a sexual identity has been in many ways a successful route
towards change. It is through acceptance of their maligned sexuality that
gay men and lesbians have found a voice, a community, a movement, and,
most importantly, each other.
The gay movement, and certainly many members of the gay commu-
nity, are moving out of adolescence. As a result, the focus has been on
marriage rather than dating. Now that the turf at issue is marriage, the
sexual definition no longer fits, and has become a hindrance. By moving
into the marriage arena, the gay movement is necessarily talking about
relationships rather than about lone individuals. The terms one hears are:
love, family, raising children, the death of one partner, shared lives. Thus,
the very subject matter brings the movement closer to the feminist view
that gays are radical because they refuse to be circumscribed by gender
restrictions as to who they should live with or love. 38 Unmistakably the
push for marriage came from the roots up, from the people themselves,
36. It has always been difficult to define the term gay, or to determine who is within
the spectrum of the gay civil rights struggle, which has gradually widened to include bisexu-
als and transgender persons. When gay is defined as those who have relationships or build
their lives with someone of their own gender, it leaves out many people, especially single
gays. But when "gay" is defined as those who are sexually active and attracted to those of
the same gender, it leaves out other gay men and lesbians, and helps paint all gay people as
sexually obsessed, which is inaccurate and destructive to the move for equal treatment of
couples. The definition of gays as sexually active with those of their own sex leaves out
bisexuals, those who consider themselves gay but have never had sex, single men and
women also, and those who are in same-sex marriages where the sexual aspect has
disappeared.
37. Not only does queer theorist Michael Bronski think gays are obsessed with sex, but
he thinks this is the key to gay liberation, what allowed gay men to be free to create their
own culture:
This historical categorization of homosexuality as a totally sexual experience
continues today. Homosexuality is considered to represent a pure, unencum-
bered form of sexuality. Not engendering new life, marriage, and apparently
employing sexuality as the primary form of self-definition, homosexuality
represents sex incarnate. In short, homosexuals are obsessed with sex. This
obsession, along with the impulse to personal freedom that makes sexual ac-
tivity possible, is at the center of the gay sensibility.
Bronski, supra note 29, at 191.
38. Progressive scholars Paula Ettlebrick and Nancy Polikoff have warned that fight-
ing for marriage would make the movement less radical and more conformist. Paula L.
Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation, OuT/LOoK NAT'L GAY AND LES-
BIAN Q., 9 (Fall 1989) and Wedlock Alert A Comment On Lesbian and Gay Family Recog-
nition, 5 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y 107 (1996) [hereinafter Wedlock Alert]; Nancy Polikoff, We
Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle
the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993). But in my
view, since marriage allows greater visibility for gay men and lesbians, it is also a liberating
force.
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not the leaders.39 One can see the progress from sick to proud to normal
as not necessarily a bad direction for the movement to take, especially
since marriage involves greater visibility for gay relationships.
In this writer's view, gays are not a sexual minority but a gender role
minority. The reason that gay relationships are threatening is because
they clearly defy sex roles-not only because boys are raised to marry
girls and vise versa, but because there are no predetermined gender roles
within the marriage. As the State of Vermont wrote in its brief, "marriage
is an institution that uniquely celebrates the complementarily of the
sexes." 40 The ideal of marriage as straight helps men feel masculine and
women feminine. As in much homophobia, discrimination in marriage is
based on fear that gays undermine the male/female, masculine/feminine
paradigm. A man who worries about his masculinity-perhaps he cannot
fix anything in the house-can still consider himself the man because he
is the man in the marriage; after all, no woman could marry his wife.
Whatever he brings to the relationship he gets to consider male or mascu-
line, but if his marriage looks just like that of two women next door, then
his masculinity is in doubt. It is the similarity between same-sex marriage
and opposite-sex marriage that is the sticking point. It is the pressure on
men to be "masculine" and the insecurity engendered by that ill-defined
requirement that spawns anti-gay sentiment. Similarly, women who cross
outside the traditional female role into the work world throughout much
of their lives can still feel "feminine" on their wedding day and in their
marriages, feminine in relation to their masculine husbands. Is this "mas-
culine/feminine" divide a mirage, a cultural packaging that takes many
shapes depending on the culture and individuals involved? The similarity
between the lives of straight and gay couples might make heterosexuals
feel that way. By preventing gay couples from calling their relations mar-
riages, insecure heterosexuals may feel their own claim to masculinity or
femininity enhanced. Hence, the use of gender to determine who can
marry and who cannot serves the uses that discrimination always does, of
making others feel better.
Lesbian and gay sexual orientations challenge traditional definitions
of gender, the presumed natural order of male superiority, the gen-
der roles and hierarchies that are based on that presumption, as well
as how normal sexual attraction is defined... the rationale for male
gender privileges based on the presumed natural origins of tradi-
tional gender roles is undermined.41
39. Seven in ten lesbians and six in ten gay men responding to a recent national survey
said they would want to marry same-sex partners if they could. Craig Christensen, If Not
Marriage? On Securing Gay & Lesbian Family Values by "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1725 (1998).
40. See State's Appeal Brief (Part 2), Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999),
available at http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/statepart2.htm. One opponent of gay marriage
disturbed by the lack of male and female sex roles in same-gender marriage stated that
"gay marriage 'would appear almost as a mocking burlesque of marriage.'" ESKRIDGE,
supra note 16, at 104.
41. Greene, supra note 21, at 21.
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The fight against gay marriage is best understood as a desperate at-
tempt to keep the gender line from further eroding, to preserve at least
some demarcations between what it means to be a man and what it means
to be a woman. The sexualizing of gay lives is simply a product of the fact
that our relationships have existed outside of society's strictures. The
term "gay" should refer to those involved with people of the same gender
or who wish to be involved romantically with someone of the same gen-
der, not a synonym for sexuality or homosexuality. Such a move will help
vitiate the vicious circle.
Others have written that opposition to gays in general and gay mar-
riage in particular is based upon sex discrimination within the culture.42
However, most commentators still consider gay sexuality to be the distin-
guishing feature of gay identity. Even John Culhane who argues that gen-
der identity is a social construct like race, writes: "Many thousands of gay
men and lesbians are living lives that, except for how they express sexual
love for each other, are indistinguishable from those of their opposite-sex
counterparts. '43 In contrast, this author suggests that gay couples are al-
most indistinguishable from their opposite-sex counterparts when they
express sexual love. It is when navigating the world without straight privi-
lege, and when structuring their relationships outside of gender role ex-
pectation that gay couples are most different from their opposite-sex
counterparts.
I am washing over differences between straight sex and gay sex, you
complain. After all, the sex act itself is different.44 "Obviously, sexual re-
lations between persons of the same gender are different from sexual re-
lations between male and female couples," opined one scholar opposed
to same-sex marriage.45 But it is not that different; rather, the meaning of
the sex act changes depending upon the gender/sex of the participants.
42. See, e.g., John Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20
CAROOZO L. REV. 1119, 1164-75 (1999); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 189 (1988); Cruz, supra note 4, at 942-44.
43. See Culhane, supra note 42, at 1138. Culhane theorizes that gay marriage chal-
lenges the assumption that men are sexually aggressive and women are sexually passive.
Chai Feldblum writes of the need for articles upholding the moral worth of gay sex to
further the marriage debate. Chai R. Feldblum, Keep the Sex in Same-Sex Marriage, 4
HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 23, 25 (1997). Cf Edward Stein, Evaluating The Sex Discrim-
ination Argument For Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 16, at 172, where he refers to a "transvestite quality" in using sex anti-discrimi-
nation laws to address same-sex marriage; it "dresses a gay rights issue up in gender rights
garb." But see id. at 162-170, where Eskridge writes of the connection between
homophobia and sexism.
44. Nor can one point to the sex acts of oral sex or sodomy, any more than kissing or
touching, as uniquely homosexual. Approximately 85% of heterosexual women engage in
oral sex, the same percentage of lesbians engaging in that conduct, and approximately
20% engage in anal sex according to studies reported in Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orienta-
tion, Morality, And The Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, n.222 (1996).
Others might argue that gays and lesbian cannot reproduce and that makes them different
from straight couples. But many straight couples never have children, some cannot, and if
we take away those times when opposite couples purposely attempt to bear children, that
still leaves an awful lot of sexual intimacy.
45. Wardle, supra note 18.
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Gender is laden with meaning within our culture. The meaning of a sex
act is different to the participants depending upon the gender of the par-
ticipants. Kissing is the same act with a man or a woman, but the gender
of the person will dramatically change the experience for most recipients.
While there are some generalized differences between gay sexuality and
straight sexuality, the only true constant is gender difference rather than
sexual position or practice.46
People with physical disabilities are not considered a sexual minority.
One could argue that physical disabilities changes the sexual encounters
between people as much as gender does, but it would be insulting to con-
clude that they are therefore a sexual minority.
47
Consider also how African-Americans are sexualized in this country.
The marriages of slaves were no more recognized than gay marriages are
today.48 The sexualizing of black men can be seen in the false rape
charges and lynchings of the past, and present day stud stereotypes, while
black women are sometimes sexualized as "whores. ''49 The quote that be-
gins this section could be applied to African-Americans and mixed-race
couples as well as to same-sex couples.
Directly on point, interracial relationships were sexualized in the
United States before Loving v. Virginia.50 This view of mixed-race love as
deviant, pornographic and sinful has gradually decreased since marriage
rights were gained. 51 Opponents of mixed-race marriages believed the
"sexual purity" of white womanhood was at stake.52 In the 1960s, an Afri-
can-American man and a white woman could not "walk down the street
without the leering, disapproving stares of passers-by, especially white
men."' 53 Even the facts of Loving are eerily suggestive of Bowers v. Hard-
46. Obviously, what opposite-sex couples do in bed varies couple to couple, as it does
among gay and lesbian couples. There is no one monolithic sexuality. Imagine three
couples, two straight and one gay. One straight couple's sexual routine may look a lot more
like the lesbian couple's than it does like the other straight couple's. To say that the lesbian
couple is sexually different from what the straight couples do is to whitewash the vast
differences among straight couples. Of course, this is just what marriage does; it creates a
zone of privacy around couples, making differences among straight couples disappear. The
only constant difference between same-gender sexuality and opposite-gender sexuality is
the gender of the participants.
47. People with disabilities have the opposite hardship: they are not seen as sexual
beings at all. Greene, supra note 21, at 31.
48. For a discussion of slave marriages see Graff. She asks "did slaves marry?" Her
answer is yes and no, comparing the state of being both married and unmarried to present
day same-sex couples. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 18-27.
49. See generally CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1997). See Anthony Farley, The
Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457, 516, 519 (1997), for a discussion of the
relation between oppression against black Americans and sexuality. In addition, feminists
have long documented the sexualization of women in this country, and demonstrated its
connection to lack of power.
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. See Ross, supra note 14, at 269 & n.64.
52. James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegena-
tion Analogy, 73 B.U.L. REV. 93, 101-02 (1993) (citing F. James Davis, WHO Is BLACK?:
ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 63 (1991)); Law, supra note 42, at 233 n.220.
53. CALVIN C. HERNTON, SEX & RACISM IN AMERICA 118 (1965, reprinted with intro-
duction 1988). See Ross, supra note 14, at 257-59.
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wick54, the sodomy case. The sheriff in Loving went to the couple's home
in the night and roused the male defendant out of bed. 55 Today, white
women who date men of another race may still be seen as sexually
loose. 56
What the sexualization of interracial couples teaches, is that sexualiza-
tion is a negative hardship imposed from the outside onto taboo (or non-
sanctioned) relationships. It also indicates that the obsession with gay sex
has little to do with promiscuity or the quantity or quality of sex within
same-sex relationships. No advocate of interracial equality would con-
sider someone sexually different because they couple with someone of a
different race. That would be perceived as racist. Yet gay people them-
selves claim the mantle of sexual minority to describe their own love and
life.
Sexuality and passion are forces for relationships, art, and consumer-
ism, but sex itself is a small part of most people's daily lives. If a couple is
together 20 years, the percentage of the time they spent engaging in coi-
tus is probably a very small portion of the time they spend together, talk-
ing, driving, eating, etc. What makes many couples (gay or straight) feel
married has to do with the relationship between them, how they talk to
each other, how they take care of each other, combined with how they
are perceived by the others as a couple. It would be interesting to read a
psychological study to find out if gays only feel gay when making love.
Ironically, that's probably the time that identity and minority status are
forgotten. Gay identity is probably strongest the rest of the time: when
buying dinner in the supermarket, going out to a restaurant, attending a
parent-teacher conference at their child's school, or deciding whether to
go to the office party together. Thus, a major sticking point in the sexual-
ized definition of gay individuals and couples is that it distorts lives.
Equating gay people with sexuality is problematic.
I have heard the objection that if relationship rather than sexuality
were the defining aspect of gay people's lives, then two men or two wo-
men who were not sexually intimate could claim to be gay, or marry. But
54. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
55. Six weeks after the Loving's were married they had a terrible shock. Sheriff Gar-
nett Brooks arrived with a warrant at the Loving's house directing him to bring "the body
of said Richard Loving" before a judge. He dragged the Lovings out of bed. They spent
the next five days in jail. Their crime was the violation of a Virginia law providing that "if
any white person intermarry with a colored person"-or vice versa-each party "shall be
guilty of a felony" and face prison terms of five years. IRONS & GUITTON, infra note 62, at
278. As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Hardwick, "The parallel between Loving
and this case is almost uncanny." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 211 n.5 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
Law, supra, note 42, at 232.
56. Herton, supra note 53. Writing in 1965, Sociologist Herton writes "This 'slut
concept'. . .weighs heavily upon any white woman who marries a Negro." I also assert this
from personal experience as a lawyer. One case in particular stands out in my mind. I
handled an evidentiary hearing after which I learned that the court officers in the room all
thought the white female prosecution witness lacked credibility. I engaged one of the of-
ficers in conversation to learn why he thought so, and found out it was because the witness
was living with a black man, and was therefore loose and trashy. I was shocked at the time,
but later on I came to expect reactions of this sort.
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is this really a problem? Mixed-sex couples who marry without any sex-
ual interest in each other are counted as straight, and are only scrutinized
if one applies for new immigration status.5 7 One is welcome to assume
that a marriage with sexual intimacy is better than the one without, but
why should only same-sex couples not have privacy in their marriages and
the opportunity to be married with as little sexual intimacy as many
straight married couples?
III. MARRIAGE PROVIDES A ZONE OF PRIVACY
AROUND SEXUALITY
Marriage serves to hide sexuality from prying eyes, providing a zone of
privacy around a couple's intimacy or lack of intimacy, and at the same
time provides greater visibility of the relationship. Without broadcasting
the sexuality within the relationship, gay relationships, particularly for
lesbians, often become invisible. For example, when I saw the film Entre
Nous,5 8 I found it to be about an intense love affair between two married
women. No sex between the two women is portrayed, which I took as
ambiguous; either the director had left it up to the imagination, or per-
haps, sadly, the women were unable to consummate their love. Again,
there was no sex shown between the married women and their husbands
either, which I also found ambiguous; it is unclear whether or not they
had sex with their husbands during the year the movie took place. Re-
viewer Pauline Kael described the movie in the New Yorker Magazine as
a "non-lesbian" film. 59 By not revealing sexual activity, the passion, im-
portance, the lesbianism of the women's relationship disappears for ma-
jor audiences. In contrast, the importance of their relationships with their
husbands does not. Because they are married, the viewer will give weight
to their relationship and will not require proof of sexual activity. Imagine
a futuristic version of Entre Nous. Again, no sex is shown, but this time
after leaving their husbands, the women marry each other. In this version,
the women's relationship will be termed lesbian while, at the same time,
allowing them privacy in their bedroom.
Many gay couples long for the privacy shield which will allow them to
hold themselves out to the world as a couple, without having to answer
questions about what they do in bed and how often. Sex is central to
some relationships. To others, sexual attraction rather than sex is the pas-
sion and glue of the relationship. To others, sex and sexual attraction are
unimportant or peripheral aspects of the marriage. This is as true for
opposite sex partnerships as for gay partnerships. Quantity and quality
57. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 48. My research assistant brought me a clipping of a come-
dian who remarked that "same-sex marriages have been around forever." After three
years of straight marriage, "people are having the same sex they had last year, and this
leads to squabbling.. .Get your hands off me." John Kelso, Cavemen's Babble Meant, 'Yes
Dear,' AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN Apr. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7334862.
58. Entre Nous (Fox Lorber 1983). Based on a real story by the daughter of one of the
women.
59. Pauline Kael, Film Review, NEW YORKER, Mar. 5, 1984, at 130.
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vary across the spectrum. One benefit marriage brings is that the couple's
sex life is not inquired into. The outside world sees their relationship as
legitimate no matter how much or how little sex they have.
This privacy for married couples is what makes it such a sought-after
commodity. Without marriage, the way to be visible was often under-
stood as flaunting one's sexuality. Marriage offers relief from the obses-
sion that causes the public to latch onto one part of gay lives and place
leering attention on it. Because marriage is "what makes sex legitimate,"
marriage allows greater visibility without sacrificing privacy.
IV. HOW DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS AND CIVIL UNIONS
MAY ERODE THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.60
The effect the sacred/profane dichotomy bears on the legal rights of
gays and lesbians can be seen poignantly in Hardwick. Justice Lewis
Powell, the swing vote that upheld the constitutionality of the sodomy
laws as applied to a consenting male couple in a bedroom, had originally
indicated he would rule the sodomy laws unconstitutional. When Justice
Powell switched his vote in Hardwick to vote with the majority, he did so
because he had trouble envisioning gay sexuality as a fundamental
right.61 Justice Powell was not sure consensual sex should be criminal-
ized, but he could not vote to grant gay sexuality the status of "funda-
mental," the same status accorded to straight married couples. Thus, he
voted with the majority to uphold the sodomy statute as applied against a
consensual relationship in Mr. Hardwick's bedroom. The jump from pro-
fane to "fundamental"-like the jump from profane to sacred-was sim-
ply too big a jump for someone like Justice Powell to make.
In Lawrence Tribe's argument against Georgia's sodomy laws, he gave
the court one image of sexual intimacy-that of a husband and wife kiss-
ing in their home. 62 The justices were expected to analogize from that
intimacy to gay intimacy, without having to think about what gay intimacy
looks like.63 Tribe's decision not to portray any form of gay intimacy is
indicative of what might be called the "profanity problem." How are the
Powells of the world to determine that gays have a fundamental right to
sexual expression when advocates dare not so much as mention a same-
60. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
61. Id. (Powell, J. concurring). Justice Powell, who was the swing vote switched his
vote during the deliberations. Later, Justice Powell believed he had made a mistake in
supporting the majority. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).
62. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT 366 (PETER IRONS & STEPHANIE GUITTON eds.
1993).
63. Justice Powell and the majority, did not do so. I think it was a mistake not to
normalize gay sexuality by discussing a long term gay couple kissing in their home rather
than a straight married couple, but many bright thinkers feel that Profesor Tribe was
rightly cautious.
[Vol. 551672
SEX, MARRIAGE AND HISTORY
gender kiss in the Supreme Court for fear it will revolt those they wish to
convince?
In moving away from the sodomy debates and into the marriage arena,
plaintiff lawyers are able to choose their litigants and put forward the
perfect plaintiffs: loving couples, loving parents, well-adjusted citizens of
the state. They are able to counteract the notion that gays are just sexual
beings by portraying gay couples who are well-rounded individuals in
long-term relationships.
Law school professors who teach Hardwick take note, for the sodomy
discussions tend to frame gays in terms of illicit sex, while a discussion of
Loving v. Virginia and same-gender marriage can round out the view of
gay people as human beings capable of love and commitment.64 Truly the
marriage cases themselves answer Fajer's call for stories about love and
intimacy to counter dominant images of promiscuous gay men.65
Baker v. Vermont and the attendant creation of civil unions in Vermont
break the circle at yet another place, the point that gay sex occurs outside
of marriage. 66 After Baker, many same-sex relationships will be recog-
nized by the State and, while not accorded the'status of marriages,
neither will they be considered quite outside marriage. The civil unions
now enacted in Vermont will provide visibility to gay couples, emphasiz-
ing "a singular human relationship" 67 and de-emphasizing sexuality as the
defining characteristic of gay lives. It should follow that these relation-
ships will gradually lose their illicit character, and gay sexuality will even-
tually no longer be viewed as profane.
V. CHALLENGING THE "MARRIAGE IS SACRED"
PROPOSITION IN THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
There are several ways to challenge the vicious circle at the point that
reads: marriage is sacred. One argument as put forward by William Es-
kridge, is that civil marriages in America are bureaucratic rather than
sacred 68 therefore, allowing gays to marry is not an endorsement of gay
64. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The sodomy battle is the traditional way that
law students are now introduced to gay issues. I would urge constitutional law professors
to teach Loving v. Virginia and gay marriage issues first, as a way of centering the discus-
sion on relationships rather than sex. The sodomy approach is due partly to Hardwick
happening to be the first case to reach the Supreme Court that involved gay rights. The
sodomy first approach is also due to the views of theorists themselves, especially queer
theorists and straight legal theorists.
65. See Fajer, supra note 17, at 520.
66. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
67. Id. One way to understand the State v. Baker decision is that the Vermont Court
decided that it was too big a jump to go from profane to sacred, and the middle ground, the
back of the bus, was therefore necessary to gradually shed the notion that gay relationships
are profane. The decision and the civil union legislation that followed from it have been
embraced within the gay community because the back of the bus is an improvement to
those who have not been able to ride at all.
68. See generally, ESKRIDGE, supra note 16. Evan Wolfson argues that the litigation in
Baher:
[i~nvolves the denial of a marriage license by the State, and has nothing to do
with private religious doctrines or ceremonies. Each religion remains free to
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marriages, because clerks do not really endorse the straight people who
obtain marriage licenses.69 It is easier to get a marriage license than a
driver's license: "However evil, perverted, or incompetent you might be,
the clerk will still give you a marriage license, because the clerk and the
state do not care about your character, morality, or competence. '70
Eskridge also details the list of benefits accorded to married couples, a
useful undertaking which connects with his theme that gays do not neces-
sarily seek to be part of some sacred ritual, but only seek the relationship
equivalent of a driver's license. A non-sacred approach will serve to bring
about a "Danish-style compromise, '71 as Eskridge calls it or marriage
"light" as Graff calls it,72 but not marriage. In a sense, the Baker decision
can be understood as an adoption of Eskridge's arguments that gays are
not seeking to be part of a sacred ritual, but only to gain all the economic
rights associated with marriage.73
While Eskridge's argument is a cogent, logical attack on the continued
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage, its persuasion value is
limited. By arguing in essence that marriages are not sacred, Eskridge
fails to take into account the public need for myths and the public's rea-
sons for keeping gay relationships second class. When people think of
marriage they have an ideal: the beautiful, slim bride and handsome
groom. The ideal persists no matter how many marriages there are which
contradict the ideal, such as beatings, verbal abuse, incompatibility and
unhappiness within many actual marriages. The ideal has survived all the
ugly facts exposed in divorce court in these past decades. Indeed it is the
reality of these real problems within the ideal that makes second class
status of gays so necessary to one segment of Americans opposed to mar-
riage rights. Just as some poor whites in the reconstruction period of
American history could consider themselves superior to African Ameri-
cans, so some straight people, no matter how bad their relationship, can
grant or withhold its sanction to same-sex unions, wholly independently of a
civil marriage. Parenthetically, there is little clamor from Catholic, Protes-
tant, Jewish, or other religious denominations when licenses are granted for
marriages performed by other faiths, even though they may not recognize
such marriages as consonant with the doctrines of their respective religions;
there, the line between civil and religious marriage is understood and
respected.
Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 n.50 (1994-1995).
69. ESKRIDGE, supra note 16.
70. Id. at 106-07. Fajer finds this argument "unbelievable" and worries that "it could
undermine the credibility" of his other arguments. Fajer, supra note 17, at 604.
71. ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 122.
72. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 52 ("marriage light" Graff writes, quoting a French
magazine).
73. "While many have noted the symbolic or spiritual significance of the marital rela-
tion, it is plaintiffs' claim to the secular benefits and protections of a singularly human
relationship that, in our view, characterizes this case." Baker, 744 A.2d at 888-89. A mar-
riage equivalent suffices, particularly if the federal government were to accord this state
recognition true economic equivalency to marriage, but the Baker decision proves that you
cannot remove the sacred from marriage without getting something else that quacks but
doesn't look like a duck.
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consider themselves superior to those poor misfits who live with members
of their own sex and cannot get married. Eskridge's tack of noting that
people who rape and murder can get married hardly moves people to
open the door to another group it considers profane.
Another way to challenge the vicious circle at the point that reads
"marriage is sacred" is to agree that marriage is sacred, but not in an
unchanging way. This is essentially what E. J. Graff did in her popular
history entitled What is Marriage For?74 In Graff's model, the notion that
same-sex couples are profane is relegated to a past where marriages were
defined differently from the way they are today. Present negative atti-
tudes are merely leftover vestiges of outdated philosophies that have as
much chance of success in the long run as did the notion that if a married
couple tried to prevent the conception of children, the wife was "no bet-
ter than a harlot."75
Graff's history of sexuality within straight marriage is a useful means of
dismantling the vicious circle. Graff divides Western civilization into
three dominant philosophies towards the role of sexuality in marriage;
these she labels "Refraining," "Reproducing" and "Refreshing." Re-
fraining refers to the view that sexual pleasure is evil and demonized.
This was the early Christian philosophy against marriage which gradually
morphed into a view that marriage was "a slightly dirty but necessary
runner-up to celibacy," justified for making babies and preventing the
greater evil, namely sex outside marriage.76 Next came the Reproducing
ideal, the belief that marriage was for having babies or making heirs.
Graff traces this early philosophy back to the Roman emperors who
needed three official offspring, and whose wedding nights usually en-
tailed rape.77 In contrast, the Refreshing ideal is the notion of marriage
as shared inner life, and sexual satisfaction. The new Refreshing ideal,
originally articulated by the nineteenth century free-lovers, recently tri-
umphed over the other two. 78
Same-sex marriage is an inevitable consequence of the triumph of the
Refreshing ideal in modern marriage, Graff theorizes. Under the Re-
74. GRAFF, supra note 1.
75. Id. at 53. See also Mary Becker, Family Law In The Secular State And Restrictions
On Same-Sex Marriage: Two Are Better Than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2001).
76. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 65.
77. Id. at 55-57. Jews are described by Graff as motivated by both reproducing and
refreshing. Id. at 69.
78. Graff's vision of past straight marriage as not necessarily companionate tends to
disprove Eskridge's assertion that past gay marriages were companionate marriages. See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 45. To understand the furor in the United States in the nine-
teenth century against contraception, Graff writes, one must realize that the Reproducing
ideal itself was being threatened by the new Refreshing ideal articulated by the nineteenth
century free-lovers. The proponents of the Comstock laws knew that "the very meaning of
marriage might change-from an institution aimed mainly at procreative duty to an institu-
tion that accepted sexual love." As horrifying as the nineteenth century free-lovers were
to dominant Christian philosophy at the time, in the 1950s, when "the Pope agreed that
husband and wife should experience pleasure and happiness in body and spirit," the Re-
freshing ideal had won. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 75-76.
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freshing ideal, marriages are supposed to be about love and integrity of
the individual conscience.
The new code put in a terrible bind anyone who . .. discovered
within herself affections and desires aimed at her own sex. How
could she now justify imprisoning herself in a baby-making mar-
riage? .... Now she had to feel a deep, intimate, personal union with
this guy - which made her inner dryness toward him an insupporta-
ble hypocrisy, even a sin.7 9
Modern marriage is also supposed to be about equality, ending centuries
of sex-role requirements, making way for same-sex couples. "Once wo-
men and men can learn and live alone; once husbands and wives are theo-
retically equal at work, in bed, and in chores; once marriage is for love
and not for money-how can society fairly bar the marriage of two peo-
ple of one sex?" 80 Changes in the meaning of marriage simultaneously
explain the advent of same-sex marriage and the prior exclusion of gays
from marriage.
The historical exclusion of gays from marriage is a result of the former
purposes of marriage, since gay relationships were anathema under the
Refraining and Reproducing ideas. If Refraining is right, then sexual
pleasure is wrong. If Reproducing is right, any act that prevents babies is
"the crime against nature." This brings the reader up to the present where
Graff points that the Refreshing ideal is triumphing over its earlier rivals.
If Refreshing is right, then gay people belong within the marriage tradi-
tion. Gay sex was wrong when sexual pleasure itself was wrong (as it was
under the Refraining philosophy). Gay sex was wrong when the only per-
missible sex was for having babies (the Reproducing philosophy). Gay
couples are demonized now because they are scapegoats for those who
reject the Refreshing ideal and want to go back to earlier philosophies of
sexuality and gender roles within marriage.81 Those unhappy with the Re-
freshing ideal target same-sex intimacy and appear to have history on
their side. But gay sex is wrong only if all sexual pleasure is wrong or if
all non-procreational sex is wrong.
Perhaps it is ironic that the sexist and tawdry history of marriage
should be used to support the right to marry. Feminists in the gay move-
ment who disapproved of the way marriage historically entrapped women
argued that gay men and lesbians should not succumb to the marriage
allure, but create new, untraditional family relationships. 82 Certainly
79. GRAFF, supra note 1, at 84.
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id. at 55. This fits with historical discussions of the sodomy statutes. Sodomy stat-
utes were broad, and aimed at all sexual encounters that were not in the orthodox manner.
However, over time, much of this non-orthodox sexuality has been accepted. Thus, gay
sodomy is really just the remains of the of the old taboos, the old battle ground, "never
mind that some 95 percent of American women say they have oral sex." Id. at 84-85. See
also Feldblum, supra note 44.
82. Ettelbrick, supra note 38, at 9; Wedlock Alert, supra note 38. See also, Nancy Poli-
koff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993).
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Graff proves that the same history can prove either point.
Graff's destabilization of the category of traditional marriage is similar
to the arguments put forward by Anne Goldstein in her critique of Justice
Burger's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. Interestingly,
[b]y 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, no addi-
tional states had singled out sexual acts between men for special pro-
hibition. Many states' statutes had been bowdlerized, however, and
now prohibited "the crime against nature" instead of "sodomy" and
"buggery." That phrase applied to acts of anal intercourse between
men and women as well as between two men. Courts in at least
seven of the thirty-two states Justice White found to have "criminal
sodomy statutes in effect in 1868," explicitly held these statutes did
not apply to oral-genital contact. Some treatise writers explicitly in-
cluded sodomy in marriage within the statutory proscription.8 3
Historically the sodomy laws applied equally to opposite sex love-mak-
ing, Goldstein noted, hence the criminalization of gay sex is not funda-
mental or traditional as the majority postulated. Goldstein criticized
Justice Burger's reliance on a long history and tradition criminalizing ho-
mosexuality as factually inaccurate because the concept of the "homosex-
ual" person is new to history. Graff has a different emphasis; rather than
argue that there is no tradition of targeting gay sex for condemnation, as
Goldstein did, Graff argues that the condemnation derives from past tra-
ditions that are now obsolete.
Pro-marriage scholarship before Graff used history differently. It re-
counted same-sex relationships in history, not straight marriage, nor was
it critical of the past.84 One of the first chapters of Eskridge's book is
devoted to the history of same-sex marriage, detailing many historical ex-
amples from around the world when two men or two women were per-
mitted to marry. For example, Eskridge describes a tradition throughout
North American Indian tribes where persons called the Berdaches cross
traditional gender lines to take on some characteristics of the opposite
sex and marry people of the same sex.8 5 The fact that Eskridge writes of
gay marriage in history while Graff writes as if there were no gay mar-
riages makes sense when one realizes that the histories are aimed at
breaking the vicious circle at different points. Eskridge uses history to
disprove that gay relationships exist outside marriage. In contrast, Graff
uses history to defeat the other equation, marriage = sacred.
83. Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality and Political Values, 97 YALE L. J.
1073, 1084-85 (1988) (citations omitted).
84. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16; JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN
POSTMODERN EUROPE 270 - 271 (1994). In an Amicus Curiae brief to the Vermont Su-
preme Court by the Professors of Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, which ad-
dresses the Baker v. State case, they adopted Eskridge's multi-cultural analysis of marriage
in arguing that "there is nothing new about same-sex marriage." They state that "through-
out human history-in ancient Egypt and Babylonia, in classical Greece, in Republican
and Imperial Rome, in most Native Cultures of the Americas, in most African cultures,
and in the Western tradition-marriage has included same-sex relationships."
85. ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 27-28. See also, BOSWELL, supra note 84, 270-71.
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Although Eskridge admits that the modern West has long been hostile
to same-sex unions, he declares that he proved "overwhelming" evidence
of same-sex marriage.8 6 The presented facts fall short of proving "over-
whelming" evidence of same-sex marriage, nor do they convince the
reader that gays are part of the (sacred) marriage tradition.87 Eskridge
has been rightly criticized for including historic situations where same-sex
couples were permitted to have intimate relationships outside of mar-
riage, and treating these examples as if they were part of a history of
same-sex marriage. By confusing relationships outside of marriage with
marriage, Eskridge fails to acknowledge that marriage is viewed as sa-
cred, and therefore distinct from relationships outside this protected
zone. Given the tendency of many readers to treat gay relationships as
akin to sex, Eskridge's examples of non-married relationships will be read
as examples of sexual relationships. Therefore, instead of proving that
gay men are part of the marriage tradition, Eskridge will be read as prov-
ing a history of gays having sex. The Berdache and other historical exam-
ples will not succeed in convincing Americans of gay's historical inclusion
in the sacred tradition because to contemporary Americans, these exam-
ples seem not sacred, but queer (in all senses of the word), and probably
as profane as Hardwick and his lover in Hardwick.88 Thus, society's sexu-
alization of gay relationships proves too deeply rooted to be undone by
Eskridge's portrayal of gay relationships in other cultures.
Graff's use of history is more successful than Eskridge's because she
harnesses the reader's antipathy for different cultures. When Eskridge
writes about the Berdache, readers are likely to see that culture as alien,
having little to say about American traditions. Similarly, readers have the
same response to Graff's descriptions of straight antecedents, that these
cultures were weird. That is precisely the response she wants. Graff
loves to provide anecdotes to prove her points and to give this effect.
89
86. "This is not to deny the modern West's hostility to same-sex unions but merely to
situate that hostility in a broader perspective." ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 7.
87. Despite assurances that he is not using the term marriage "casually", his history
includes "any kind of culturally or legally tolerated institution whereby individuals of the
same sex are bonded together in relationships for reasons of affinity, economy, or society."
Id. at 16-17.
88. Hardwick was a challenge to Georgia's sodomy law, which was gender neutral on
its face. A police officer entered Michael Hardwick's bedroom and observed him in the act
of oral sex and arrested him. The Supreme Court narrowly upheld the criminal sodomy
statute, ruling that the Constitutional right of privacy did not extend to this activity. Id. at
180.
89. For example, here is Graff on the early church's desire to contain sexuality within
marriage:
The monks and theologians offered a little jumpstart towards angelic life by
helpfully ruling sex off-bounds just as often as they could-for instance, dur-
ing menstruation, pregnancy, or nursing (which could be as long as two
years), and on holy days- such as Thursdays, in memory of Jesus' betrayal,
Fridays, in memory of his death, Saturdays, in honor of the virgin Mary, on
Sundays, of course, on Mondays, in memory of the departed souls, as well as
forty days before Easter, Pentecost, Christmas, on feasts, fasts, and even-
imagine!-on the wedding night ....
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A ninth century theologian wrote that "it is better for a wife to permit
herself to copulate with her own father in a natural way than with her
husband against nature." 90 Graff takes pains to explain that copulate
"against nature" meant intercourse with contraception, or oral or anal
intercourse, or a position where the man is not on top, or using with-
drawal technique to avoid pregnancy. The contemporary reader finds
these moralisms perverse rather than sacred. Her history of marriage is
not the history of a sacred institution, but a history of an institution that
was improved immensely by change, and that only becomes sacred to the
extent it truly embraces the love and intimacy ideal.
Although Graff challenges the core notion that marriage is sacred in a
traditional, unchanging way, unlike Eskridge, Graff does not attempt to
shatter the myth that current marriages are ideal. In fact, Graff uses the
word "sacred" to describe her own marriage and she writes of same-sex
couples: "when we love we, too, find sex to be a sacrament, a language for
love, a marital bond." 91
Graff's theory may be understood as a set of logical statements that




sacred so gays should
be allowed to marry
Sacred marriages
(today) are based on
Same-sex marriages love and affection
(today) are based on love
and affection
E.J. Graffs Version Of The Sacred And Profane In Marriage
Graff's argument can be understood as a new syllogism that reads: if
marriage is about love and affection, and same-sex relationships are
about love and affection, then marriage must include same-sex marriage.
VI. CONCLUSION
The quest for marriage rights can be understood as a yearning for pri-
vacy around sexuality, coupled with visibility for the relationship and its
romance. As Graff writes, the word marriage cannot "possibly encompass
whatever the two of you are to each other-best pals or intimate ene-
GRAFF, supra note 1, at 60-61. This was in Augustine's time, who lived in the fourth and
fifth centuries.
90. Id. at 63. Ninth century theologian Bernadine of Siena also pontificated that if
married couples tried to prevent making babies the wife was no better than a harlot. Id. at
53.
91. Id. at 85-86, 246 (emphasis added).
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mies; passionate lovers or exhausted parents who can't remember the last
time you had sex .... All that variety-quite rightly-gets collapsed in
the eyes of the law."'92 Many gay couples long for the privacy shield which
will allow them to hold themselves out to the world as a couple, without
having to answer questions about what they do in bed and how often.
One problem with defining gay people in sexual terms is that if sexual
intimacy is perceived as profane, then to define gay people as those that
commit profane acts is not persuasive to those who resist granting full
citizenship to gays and lesbians. Such nomenclature feeds into the tautol-
ogy posed by conservative judges after Hardwick. Namely, if gays are
defined as those who commit sodomy, and it is permissible to criminalize
sodomy, then gay people are not protected, period.93 Again there is the
circular reasoning which makes it so difficult to obtain the right to marry.
Gays are a sexual minority, defined by their sexuality, which is different
and illegal. Therefore, gays should not be treated equally, and especially
not provided the mantle of marriage.94
There is an obsession with gay sexuality, a sexualization of same-gen-
der relationships. Thus Romeo and Juliet is perceived as a pure romance,
but if Juliet was a second man's part, the play would be seen by many as
more sordid than pure. This article has shown that the American obses-
sion with gay sexuality is primarily a function of the fact that gay sexuality
has existed until now, outside of marriage, and is therefore subject to the
taboo and fascination towards all sexual encounters outside of marriage.
Gay male promiscuity, real or imagined, is not the cause. At its root, the
sexualization of gay men and lesbians is part of a larger obsession with
sexuality based on repression by religion and the state. Fear of sexuality
has been a useful tool for those in power to control the majority. Only
certain kinds of sexuality were permitted and that was limited to sex
within marriage. Since same-sex couples were not able to marry, intimacy
between same-sex partners was illicit, off-limits, and profane.
The push for marriage gives fresh insight into the debate about whether
sexuality lies at the heart of gay identity. The vicious circle illuminates the
interrelation between the sexualizing of gay men and lesbians, and their
92. Id. at 38.
93. For the rationale that if homosexual conduct can be criminalized, then homosexu-
als cannot be protected by the Constitution, see, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (1987)
("The issue presented us is only whether homosexuals, when defined as persons who en-
gage in homosexual conduct, constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect classification"). See list
of cases presented in Justice Dooley's concurrence in Baker.
94. Marriage would do an end run around Hardwick. For if Hardwick stands for the
proposition that only sexuality within marriage is entitled to privacy rights under the con-
stitution, and illicit sexuality constitutes sex outside of marriage, then married same-sex
couples will be protected. Of course Hardwick would still leave the "haves" and the "have-
nots," with unmarried gays lumped together with unmarried opposite-sex couples. But the
destructive tailwinds of that decision will be abated once gays obtain marriage rights since
the status of sexual outcast bestowed on gays in the decision will no longer be able to be
used to broad-brush all gay people, in all areas of law. Once gay couples can marry, then
much of the power of Hardwick is over. Marriage affords that precise shield of privacy
protection that has not been generally unavailable to gay couples in this country.
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exclusion from marriage. This article shows how sexuality is just one part
of same-sex marriage, and how the sexualizing of same-sex relationships
distorts the reality of these relationships as well as fueling opposition to
civil marriages. The gay community in general has framed gay identity as
a sexual identity. There has been a tendency within the gay movement to
describe gay relationships in sexual terms rather than in terms of relation-
ship and gender. Thus, the term "sexual orientation" might be replaced
by "relationship orientation" or "same-sex orientation" in contexts that
describe relationships rather than sexuality. The fixation on gay sexuality
harms the quest for marriage rights and is a distortion of most gay peo-
ple's lives. One proposal this article makes is that the gay community
examine its use of language to determine if it encourages a sexualized and
distorted view of gay life and love.
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